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Marriage, Partnership and Sexual Orientation: 
A Study of British University Academics and Administrators
*
 
Using a unique data source on marital status, partnership and sexual orientation of 
academics and administrators at British universities, we estimate the impact of personal 
relationships upon earnings for men and women. While university data cover a relatively 
homogeneous group of workers, the two sides of the university are very different, with 
administrative jobs being more like the general job market in the economy. We find a large 
and significant married male premium, but only on the administrative side of the university. 
There is no female marriage premium, and no partnership return to gay men or to either 
heterosexual or homosexual women. 
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People enter into a variety of personal relationships. They can be unattached, in a 
partnership, or married.  They can be heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual.  They may 
have children.  What are the wage implications of various forms of households?  We 
investigate this using a unique data source on marital status, partnership and sexual 
orientation of academics and administrators at British universities. 
 
Empirical studies show consistently that married men earn higher wages than women 
(both married and unmarried) and unmarried men.  The premium may be a reward for 
higher productivity arising from a traditional household organisation where the male 
concentrates upon market production and the female upon household production (Becker, 
1965).  Alternatively, the measured differential may not be a direct return to marriage but 
may instead reflect a selection effect where more able males marry and less able males 
remain single.  In both these cases, the higher wage may be in response to an individual’s 
actual productivity, or it may reflect a form of statistical discrimination or signalling.  A 
final possibility is that the married male premium reflects a taste for discrimination, and 
is not correlated with increased productivity.  US studies, including Korenman and 
Neumark (1991), Akerlof (1998), and Lundberg and Rose (2002), and the UK study by 
Bardasi and Taylor (2005), seek to control for selection by using panel data and fixed 
effects estimation.  These studies find that there remains a large married male wage 
differential after controlling for selection, which may make up half of the overall 
premium.   
 
Since marriage is not generally available to lesbians and gay men, they are excluded from 
any direct earnings rewards due to marriage.  It is therefore of interest whether or not   3
unmarried partnership serves a similar role in leading to a wage premium for 
heterosexuals or for LGB (lesbian, gay and bisexual) individuals.  A small literature has 
examined whether or not unmarried heterosexual cohabitation produces similar wage 
effects to marriage.    The results are mixed.  Stratton (2002) finds a positive return for 
males to cohabitation, but not after controlling for fixed effects.  Loh (1996), in contrast, 
finds that the positive and significant return to cohabitation for males estimated using 
OLS actually increases using fixed-effects estimation.  Mamum (2004) finds a positive 
and significant return to cohabitation for white and black men, but not for Hispanics, 
after controlling for selection.   
 
LGB partnerships may differ in their economic impact compared to heterosexual 
partnerships.  They may show greater equality in the allocation of market and home 
production tasks.  There may be less of a selection effect if the mating process differs for 
LGB and heterosexual individuals.  There is very little information in the literature about 
the effects of partnership among LGB people.  Carpenter and Gates (2004) compare 
cohabiting and non-cohabiting gay men and find that their characteristics (such as 
education and income) differ significantly.  Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) find that there is 
positive assortative mating (in both non-economic and labour market characteristics) for 
heterosexual marriages and partnerships, and same-sex cohabiting partnerships.   
 
We use a unique dataset from British universities to examine the salary returns to 
different forms of relationships, taking account of sexuality and household organisation 
(such as childcare responsibilities).  For heterosexual males, we find a significant return 
of 13% to marriage and an insignificant 6% return to unmarried partnership.  This differs 
across the university: for administrators, the male marriage premium is over 21% while, 
for academics, it is statistically insignificant and of the same magnitude (about 7%) as for   4
females.  LGB males and females have no return to partnership, on either the academic or 
administrative side of the university.  Childcare responsibilities have no effect on 
earnings, having controlled for part-time working.    
   
2. The Data 
 
The UK Association of University Teachers (AUT) conducted an on-line survey of six 
representative British universities, between December 2000 and February 2001.  The 
‘Fairness at Work’ survey was organised by the AUT Equal Opportunities Committee to 
examine the treatment of sexual orientation, gender, and ethnicity in the academic labour 
market.  With the permission of the Vice Chancellors, a letter was distributed to all staff 
inviting them to participate.  A total of 813 responses were received, consisting of 51% 
women and 49% men.  Of these, only 706 were usable for this study because of missing 
information.  Some 23 respondents did not provide information on sexual orientation, 
while 40 failed to provide information about salary and 42 failed to provide information 
about race.  Academics comprised 54% of the sample of 706 individuals and 
administrators 46%.   
 
The survey asked 38 questions covering issues including job characteristics (salary, type 
of university and location) and personal characteristics (age, experience, partnership 
status, childcare responsibilities, gender and sexuality).  A full discussion of the data 
appears in Frank’s (2006) study of wages and promotions.  An extensive literature 
examines pay in universities (Ehrenberg, 2003).  To our knowledge, ours is the first study 
to look at personal relationships in universities.   
   5
Individuals were asked if they ‘currently have a partner’, without further definition in the 
survey, so this may include cohabiting and non-cohabiting relationships.  There was a 
separate question about marriage.  Marriage is prohibited among same-sex partners in the 
UK, although civil partnership (with equivalent rights to marriage) was introduced in 
2005, after the AUT survey.  The question used to elicit sexual orientation is: 'Which best 
indicates your sexual orientation at present? (Please indicate one) Heterosexual, Bisexual, 
Lesbian, Gay, Other'.   
 
Table 1 gives the means of these and other variables used in our analysis. Age was 
obtained in bands in the survey. We converted these into the dummy variables shown in 
Table 1. University sector experience is in years.  Human capital is measured by holding 
a PhD, and also by undergraduate degree classification, where ‘first class’ is the top 
category, followed by ‘upper second’.
 1  We include a dummy variable ‘medicine subject 
area’ to reflect the explicitly higher pay scales in this field.  There is also a supplement 
paid to staff in London universities, so we include a dummy variable ‘London’.  Ethnicity 
is measured by ‘white’ and ‘non-white’.  Posts at all ranks can be held on a ‘temporary’ 
basis, for a fixed number of years, as well as with permanency (‘tenure’ or ‘tenure-
track’).  Posts at all ranks can also be held on a ‘full time’ or ‘part time’ basis.         
 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
 
                                                            
1 Degrees in the UK are classified in accordance with grades received in exams over the 3-year period of 
the undergraduate degree, with a bigger weighting being given to the last year. A first-class degree is 
relatively rare in the overall population of university graduates. For example Booth (1993), using the 1986 
British National Survey of 1980 Graduates, found that only 7% of employed male graduates and nearly 4% 
of employed female graduates held a first class degree, while 27% of male and 31% of female graduates 
held an upper-second class degree. In contrast, in our sample of university employees, 23% hold a first-
class degree, reflecting the higher academic ability of the sample.    6
Column [1] gives means for the entire sample (both heterosexual and LGB), while 
Column [2] gives means for all heterosexuals, and Columns [3] and [4] give means for 
the heterosexuals disaggregated by whether they are employed as academics or 
administrators. The final column gives means for the LGB sub-sample.  For heterosexual 
men (women), 61% (46%) are married and a further 25% (36%) are in an unmarried 
partnership. LGB individuals are 13% of the sample.
2  The majority of gay men (58%) 
and lesbians (60%) are in a partnership, although these are smaller percentages than 
adding together marriages and unmarried partnerships for male and female heterosexuals.  
Individuals were asked if they ‘have childcare responsibilities’.  Affirmative answers 
represent a small proportion of each group (no more than 20%), so it is reasonable to 
expect that individuals are referring to significant childcare responsibilities rather than 
just whether or not they have children.  Childcare responsibilities are higher (17% for 
males and 15% for females) for heterosexuals than for LGB (7% for males and 6% for 
females).  
 
We have done a number of calculations on the raw data, not reported in the Table.  The 
lower figures for females in marriage and with childcare responsibilities probably arise 
from the fact that a much higher percentage are in the under 30 age range (26% for 
heterosexual females and 13% for heterosexual males).  In the raw data, heterosexual 
married males earn on average £35,754, well above the average for unmarried partnered 
heterosexual males £28,212, and that for single heterosexual males, £24,704.  Among gay 
men, partnered individuals actually earn less on average, £28,616, than single 
individuals, £29,907.  For heterosexual females, the figures are £26,547 (married), 
                                                            
2 It is possible that the purpose of the survey – made clear in the cover letter – induced disproportionate 
participation by LGB individuals.  Black et al. (2000) provide a comprehensive discussion of LGB 
representation in US data sources.  In the US General Social Survey, 3.2% of men and 2.6% of women can 
be viewed as homosexual/bisexual, based on behaviour [Blandford (2003)].       7
£21,841 (partnered), and £23,808 (single).  Partnered lesbians earn an average of 
£24,286, less than single lesbians at £27,092.  The raw data suggest a large marriage 
premium for heterosexual men, smaller premiums for married women and partnered 
heterosexual men, and a negative premium for partnered LGB. 
 
Within the university, white collar jobs are relatively homogeneous and held by well-
educated workers.  However, there are important distinctions between academic and 
administrative jobs.  Academic jobs have flexibility in scheduling hours of work between 
the university and home, which is particularly advantageous to women raising children.  
Administrative jobs are more like traditional jobs in the economy.
 3  There is also the 
belief that the academic side of the campus might be more comfortable with alternative 
lifestyles including LGB relationships and non-married heterosexual partnerships.  The 
administrative side of the university might be more likely to reward traditional family 
structures, with a high male marriage premium.  In Table 1, we present averages of the 
variables separately for heterosexual academics and administrators.  The only clear 
differences are that the academics are more likely to be male and to have the highest 
undergraduate degree classification – “first class”.
  They are also more likely to hold the 
PhD.
4   Using calculations not presented in the Table, the average salary for married male 
heterosexual academics is £36,613, while that for unmarried male heterosexual 
academics is £29,191.  On the administrative side, the corresponding figures are £34,109 
and £24,597, suggesting a larger marriage pay premium.  There is evidence in the raw 
data of a wage penalty for gay men on the administrative side, with the average salary of 
heterosexual men being £29,608 and that of gay men being £25,901.  For academics, the 
                                                            
3 Note that in Britain it is not the case that all administrators were once academics. It is possible to become 
a university administrator via other avenues. 
4 The fact that a sizable proportion of our academic sample does not hold a PhD may be surprising to North 
American readers. It reflects the fact that, until around 25 years ago, it was possible to obtain an academic 
job with only a first-class undergraduate degree. Indeed, some of the most eminent of older UK academics   8
average salary of heterosexual men is £33,983, while that of gay men is virtually the 
same at £33,358. 
 
3.  Regression Results  
  
 Although our data are cross-sectional, we initially set out a more general econometric 
model in order to highlight the various issues involved in estimating the wages effects of 
marriage and partnership for both heterosexuals and LGB. Suppose that the natural log of 
the annual salary  it y  of individual i in time t is given as:  
   it i it p it m it it e p m y + + + + = ν α α β
' x                                                 (1) 
where x is a vector of exogenous observable characteristics that influence y,  β  is the 
vector of coefficients associated with x,  m  denotes marital status and  p  unmarried 
partnership status, and v   is an individual-specific unobservable term included to account 
for the possibility that there may be factors unobserved by the econometrician affecting 
the individual’s market productivity and hence salary.  Thus  i v  is interpreted as 
unobserved heterogeneity such as ability.  Finally,  it e  is the unobservable random error 
term assumed to be distributed independently of the  i v .  
 
The coefficients  m α  and  p α  represent the ‘marriage’ and ‘partnership’ premiums.  The 
Becker (1965) model suggests that, in a traditional household, the male spouse (and 
perhaps, to a lesser extent, an unmarried male partner) will devote more time and effort to 
market production, while the female will devote more time and effort to household 
production.  As a result,  m α  and  p α are typically thought to be positive for heterosexual 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
are in this situation, including at least one Nobel Prize laureate.     9
males, and potentially negative for females.  It is also generally believed that the 
allocation of tasks may be more equal in LGB partnerships, so that there is less reason for 
positive partnership premiums for gay men and negative ones for lesbian women.   
However, another explanation for positive marriage and partnership premiums is that 
there are increasing returns to household production – it is just as easy to cook for two as 
for one.  In this case, the coefficients may be positive for LGB partnerships as well as for 
heterosexual marriages and partnerships.  A further explanation for a positive marriage 
premium for heterosexual males is either a taste for discrimination, or a belief that 
married males are more stable than unmarried males [see Akerlof (1998)].  It is unlikely 
that gay men in partnerships would benefit from this effect.     
 
Attempting to measure  m α  and  p α by OLS leads to a potential bias due to selection 
effects.  Although we cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity as our data are cross-
sectional, it is worth considering the potential direction of any bias. If unobserved 
heterogeneity (such as ability)  i v   is positively correlated with marriage and partnership, 
perhaps because more ‘able’ individuals have better social skills that encourage 
successful relationships, then even if  it e  is iidN(0,σ
2
u), estimating (1) by OLS leads to 
an over-estimate of the α  values.  If panel data were available, (1) could be differenced 
to remove any fixed effect of this sort.  However, if (for example) marriage is 
endogenous and in particular depends upon  it e  – perhaps because individuals with a 
positive earnings shock can afford the costs of marriage or have a greater incentive to 
have binding contracts over the disposition of assets in the event of a relationship 
breakdown – then even estimating the differenced equation leads to a biased estimate of 
m α .  In any case, we have only cross-sectional data so we cannot difference (1) to 
remove any fixed effect.  Insofar as, in both LGB partnerships and in heterosexual   10
marriages, ‘more is more’ in choosing a partner, the selection effect is positive and the 
estimated  m α  and  p α exceed the ‘true’ value.  Both the household production effect and 
the selection effect suggest a positive heterosexual male marriage premium, while 
selection effects suggest a positive LGB male and female partnership premium.  The 
household production effect and the selection effect are expected to operate in opposite 
directions for female heterosexual marriage.  The selection effect for heterosexual 
unmarried partnerships proves to be complicated, as shown in Booth and Frank (2006), 
and can go in either direction.   
 
Table 2 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the log annual salary with 
respect to a number of individual and job characteristics.  Employer-specific dummy 
variables control for employer fixed effects (unreported to preserve university 
anonymity).   
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
Column (1) reports estimates from the sample of all LGB individuals, with t-statistics in 
parentheses.  We find small and insignificant negative partnership coefficients for both 
males and females.  This is consistent with the idea that LGB individuals share market 
and household production more equally than in heterosexual marriages, and that they do 
not gain in partnerships from a positive taste for discrimination from employers.  It is 
perhaps surprising that increasing returns to scale, and a positive selection effect, do not 
show up in a significant positive coefficient for either LGB men or women. 
 
To provide a direct comparison between heterosexuals and homosexuals, we estimate in 
column (2) the full sample of heterosexuals, but combine both married and unmarried 
heterosexual partners into one variable.  There is a statistically significant 10% gain to   11
(combined married and unmarried) partnership for male heterosexuals, with a negative 
and insignificant effect for female heterosexuals.  On the assumption that LGB and 
heterosexual men form partnerships on the basis of positive assortative matching, as in 
Jepsen and Jepsen (2002), the selection effect should be similar for the two groups.  The 
difference in outcomes (with a positive heterosexual male partnership coefficient) 
therefore is likely to reflect household allocation of tasks and a taste for discrimination by 
employers.   
 
Column (3) reports estimates from the sample of all heterosexuals, but distinguishing 
between marriage and unmarried partnerships.  There is a statistically significant 13% 
marriage premium for men and none for women; there is an insignificant gender 
premium; and there are insignificant coefficients on childcare responsibilities for men 
and women.  There is a positive but insignificant unmarried partnership premium for 
men, and a negative but insignificant one for women.  We considered additional 
unreported estimations.  Estimating only over the male heterosexual sample (284 
individuals), we found a marriage effect of 0.1221 (t-statistic 1.96); over the female 
heterosexual sample (329 individuals), we find a marriage effect of 0.0166 (0.38).
  
Among the unmarried partners in the survey, there may be both cohabiting and non-
cohabiting couples.  While there is no direct question on cohabitation, the survey does 
ask whether ‘you and your partner currently have any shared financial commitments (e.g. 
rent, mortgage, childcare, etc.)’.  Among unmarried partners, this can be taken to 
represent a greater degree of commitment, and possibly a proxy measure for 
cohabitation.
5  Introducing this into the male heterosexual regression, but not reported in 
Table 2, we find the wage premiums: 0.1282 (t-stat 2.27) for marriage; 0.0745 (1.14) for 
                                                            
5 Among married males, 94% report shared financial commitments; among married females, 97% report 
shared financial commitments.  In contrast, 64% (61%) of unmarried male (female) heterosexuals with   12
partnership with shared financial commitments; and 0.0229 (0.31) for other partnerships.  
This suggests that a higher degree of commitment in a relationship is reflected in a higher 
wage premium.  None of the relationship coefficients are significant for heterosexual 
women.   
 
Academic and administrative jobs are very different.  For this reason we estimate 
separate regressions for heterosexuals holding administrative and those holding academic 
jobs, reported in Columns (4) and (5).
6  The main result is that the male marriage 
premium coefficient is much higher (and statistically significant) among administrators 
(21.21%, t-statistic 2.19) than among academics (7.71%, t-statistic 1.21).  As a further 
test of whether or not the male marriage premium differs significantly across the 
academic and administrative sides of the university, we ran a regression (not reported in 
the Table) with marriage as the only relationship variable but allowing different 
coefficient values for academics and administrators on all variables.  We found a married 
male premium of coefficient of 0.1821 (t-statistic 3.06) over all jobs, but with a negative 
additive impact for academics of -0.1498 (t-statistic 1.94, significant at 5.2%).   
 
 
4.  Interpretation and Conclusion 
 
University data have the advantage of presenting a relatively homogeneous group of 
well-educated workers, in what is typically perceived to be an enlightened sector in terms 
of attitudes to less traditional relationships.  The homogeneity of the sample means that 
many of the causes of the gender pay gap – such as job segregation – tend not to hold.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
partners report shared financial commitments.  The figures for LGB men and women are 55% and 62%.   
6 We also experimented with running a pooled regression with academic status interacted with LGB and   13
However, the academic and the administrative sides of the university are very different in 
terms of job flexibility and in attitudes.  This study is the first, to our knowledge, that 
looks at the impact of traditional marriage and non-traditional relationships on wages in 
the university sector.   
 
Our main results can be summarised as follows: 
•  We find small and insignificant negative partnership coefficients for both male 
and female LGB, as compared with non-partnered LGB.  This is consistent with 
the idea that LGB individuals share market and household production more 
equally than in heterosexual marriages, and that they do not gain in partnerships 
from a positive taste for discrimination from employers.   
•  For heterosexuals, for whom we are able to distinguish between marriage and 
unmarried partnerships, there is a statistically significant 13% marriage premium 
for men and none for women.  There is a positive but insignificant unmarried 
partnership premium for men, and a negative but insignificant one for women.   
•  To compare directly heterosexuals and homosexuals, we also combined both 
married and unmarried heterosexual partners into one variable, and find a 
significant 10% gain to (combined married and unmarried) partnership for male 
heterosexuals, with a negative and insignificant effect for female heterosexuals.   
•  Because academic and administrative jobs are very different, we also estimate 
separate regressions for heterosexuals holding either administrative or academic 
jobs, and find that the male marriage premium coefficient is much higher among 
administrators than among academics.   
•  The gender coefficient is insignificant once we allow for gender-specific marriage 
and partnership effects.  The persistence of gender pay gaps in the economy does 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
found that this was statistically insignificant.   14
not mean that all women do worse than all men – our results suggest that the 
beneficiaries of the gender pay gap are married men, not single men.   
•  Childcare responsibilities seem to have no effect for our sample.   It is likely that 
the relative flexibility of even full-time university jobs – in terms of choice of 
hours worked and location – limits negative pay impacts in both academic and 
administrative jobs.  
  
Our new results have potential implications for understanding the male marriage 
premium and support research that shows there may only be a limited explanatory role 
for selection (see Antonovics and Town (2004), Chun and Lee (2001) and Ginther and 
Zavodny (1998)).  The alternative explanation in the literature emphasises traditional 
household arrangements or a taste by the employer for rewarding traditional marriage.  It 
is possible that this is more likely to hold on the administrative side of the university, and 
this may explain the high magnitude of the male marriage premium for administrators 
relative to academics. 
 
Since LGB partners are generally prevented from marriage, and thereby gaining from any 
associated marriage wage premium, it is of interest to ask whether a similar premium 
holds for partnerships.  Unmarried heterosexual and LGB partnerships may not follow a 
traditional household allocation of tasks to the same extent as with marriage.  However, 
partnerships might gain in the same way as marriage from economies of scale in home 
production, allowing both partners to devote more effort to market production.   
Unmarried partners might also gain from a selection effect in terms of ability and an 
enlightened employer might see LGB partnerships in particular as showing a degree of 
stability not evidenced by single males or unmarried heterosexual partners.  It is therefore 
important that our results show no return to partnership for LGB males or females.  It   15
may be that formal civil partnerships, introduced in some US states and in the UK, will 
have a more positive effect than the informal partnerships in our data.  This represents an 
interesting avenue for future research.      16




Mean – whole 
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[2] 












Mean –  














Experience  (yrs.)  10.07 10.21 10.88 9.38  9.11 
 
Percentage of the Sample with the Characteristic: 
 
 
Age under 30  0.19  0.20  0.18  0.22  0.15 
Age 30 – 39  0.36  0.35  0.38  0.31  0.45 
Age 40 – 49  0.26  0.25  0.23  0.27  0.31 
Age 50 – 59  0.17  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.08 
Age 60 and over  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01 
London  0.21 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.23 
White  0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.91 
First class degree  0.23  0.22  0.32  0.10  0.23 
Upper second class 
degree 
0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.39 
PhD  0.46 0.47 0.67 0.23 0.34 
Academic  staff  0.54 0.54 1.00 0.00 0.46 
Medicine subject 
area 
0.22 0.22 0.27 0.15 0.23 
Temporary  post  0.44 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.43 
Full time post  0.89  0.88  0.90  0.85  0.89 
Male  0.47 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.53 
 


















0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.06 
Married  –  male  0.51 0.61 0.65 0.54 0.00 
Married  –  female  0.41  0.46  0.45  0.47  0.00 
Non-married 
partner – male 
0.30 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.58 
Non-married 
partner – female 
0.40 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.60 
       




   17

























Gender & Family     
Male 0.0212       
(0.20)    
-0.0148 
(0.25)    
-0.0128 
(0.21) 
-0.0849   
(0.85)    
0.0479 
(0.67)    
Childcare responsibilities 
– male 
0.0397   
(0.31)    
0.0107     
(0.28)    
-0.0028   
(0.07)    
0.0158    
(0.20)    
-0.0370    
(0.87)    
Childcare responsibilities 
– female 
0.0848   
(0.62)    
0.0173   
(0.44)   
0.0154    
(0.38)   
0.0318    
(0.46)    
-0.0164   
(0.34)   
Married – male      0.1320   




(1.21)    
Married –  female      -0.0051  
(0.11)   
-0.0555    
(0.71)    
0.0642   
(1.11)    
Partnered – male 
 
-0.0114    
(0.13)    
0.1048   







Partnered – female  -0.0507   
(0.53)    
-0.0126    







Other Attributes        
Age 30-39  0.1816    
(1.86)    
0.1405      
(3.70)    
0.1362    
(3.56) 
0.1455 
(2.26)    
0.1147 
(2.57) 
Age 40-49  0.4007      
(3.26)    
0.2121          







Age 50-59  0.5455  
(2.91)    
0.3043     







Age 60 and over  0.1569 
(0.46)    












0.0219     
(4.18)   
0.0277    
(3.11)    
0.0099   
(1.56)    




-0.0004    
(2.78)    
-0.0005    
(1.97)    
-0.0001    





0.1006   
(1.20) 
0.2081   
(1.35)    
0.0084    
(0.09) 
White 0.0031   
(0.03)    
-0.0672    
(1.11)   
-0.0591    
(0.97)    
-0.0849    
(0.86)    
-0.0182    
(0.25)    
First class degree  0.0673    
(0.76)    
-0.0056     
(0.16)    
-0.0070   
(0.21)    
-0.0463     
(-0.62)    
-0.0082    
(-0.23)    
Upper second class 
degree 
0.0316  
(0.45)    
0.0294    
(1.03)    
0.0324   
(1.14)    
0.0723  
(1.52)    
-0.0024    
(0.07)    
PhD  0.0913   
(1.20)    
0.1049       
(3.51)  
0.1062    
(3.54)    
0.1650    
(2.87)    
0.0740    
(2.25)    
Academic staff  0.1851  
(2.56)    
0.0803   
(2.96) 
0.0789    
(2.90) 
  
Medicine subject area  0.2104     
(2.87)    
0.1871     
(6.04)    
0.1847    
(5.96)    
0.1699 
(2.79)    
0.1953 
(5.89)    
Temporary post  -0.1968    
(-2.93)   
-0.1733     
(5.79)    
-0.1711    
(5.71)    
-0.1184     
(2.42) 
-0.2383  
(6.37)    
Full time post  0.0731   
(0.77)    
0.3545     
(8.90)    
0.3535    
(8.86)    
0.3472    
(5.51) 
0.3347    
(6.61)    
Sample size  93  613  613  276  337 
Adjusted R squared  0.60  0.54  0.54  0.49  0.58 
Notes: (i) t-statistics in parentheses. (ii) For Columns [1-3], partners are unmarried only; for Columns [4-5], they are both 
married and unmarried.   18
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